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of a controlling block of corporate shares
an
when
holding
opportunity to sell at the same price
is not given to the other shareholders? If he does so, must
he account to the corporation or to the other shareholders
for the part of the proceeds which represent the "control

May

the

owner

sell his

premium"?

These

questions

are

ably

discussed in

recent

law-review articles by Professor Richard W. Jennings (44
Calif 1. Rev. I) and Professor Noyes Leech (104 U. of
Pa. 1. Rev. 725). These articles marshal evidence of a
trend restricting the freedom of controlling shareholders to
sell their shares. Professor Jennings supports the flat rule that
when control is sold all shareholders should have an op
portunity to sell on the same terms. In this paper I wish to

grounds for such a rule and to indicate why I
believe them unsatisfactory.
To clear the way for a consideration of the central ques
tion, it is necessary first to refer to three theories upon
which relief may be given against the seller in certain special
examine the

situations.

ofoffice.-Corporate officers or directors may not re
paid to induce them to resign or to aid others in
becoming their successors. This rule was developed in cases
Sale

tain

sums

no sale of shares was involved, but it has been in
voked also where an agreement for sale of controlling
shares required the seller to facilitate the buyer's gaining

where

control of the board

by causing successive resignations of
of nominees of the buyer. It is
substitution
directors and
that
this constitutes a sale of directorships as well as
argued
the
shares, and
argument has added force if an identifiable
of
the
consideration seems to have been paid for thus
part
procuring the election of new directors.
Such a case was Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427 (1914), in
which a uniform price per share was offered to majority
and minority holders alike, but with a separate "control
fund" paid to the defendants (and not distributed among
them according to stock ownership). The court required
the defendant to account for the "control fUnd," and the
opinion shows the danger of a separate allocation of con
sideration for control. It is reasonable to infer, however,
that the consideration was separated in this manner because

the seller

to account for a
portion of the price on the
that
offices
have
been sold.
theory
corporate
sale
some
of the cases requiring
Inducing
by minority.-In

quire

Bar Association

Vol. 6, No.2

accounting for the premium, the sellers were directly im
plicated in representations or suggestions made to the
minority that the price offered to them was the same as
that which the majority were receiving. This was the situa
tion in Dunnettv. Am, 71 F. zd 912 (C.A. loth, 1934). Here

given to shareholders who relied upon a com
interpretation that all share
holders were treated equally. The court also spoke of the
sale of the controlling shares as a "corporate transaction"
recovery

was

munication which invited the

analogous

sale of assets, in which shareholders would
equally. The actual ground of the decision is

to a

participate

in the fact that the court denied
shareholders
who made no showing of re
recovery
liance upon the misleading communication. In a related
case it was later
pressed upon the court that its "corporate
transaction" theory would justify recovery on behalf of all
shareholders. The court rejected this argument, however,
and again refused relief to shareholders who were not mis
led. Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F. zd 68 (C.A. loth, 1937).

clearly shown, however,
to

Negligent sale to irresponsible buyer.-In another group of
liability has been imposed where controlling shares

cases

sold to persons who later looted the corporation and
where the sale was made under circumstances putting the
were

seller

notice of the

probability of such injury. The lead
involved
investment
ing
companies which are subject
to
of
because
the liquidity of their assets.
peculiar danger
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
on

cases

(E.D.
olds)

Pa.,

1940),42

28 N.Y.S. zd

In these

liability

Supp.

126

(1941).

622,30 N.Y.S. zd 755

Gerdes

(Sup.

v.

Reyn

1941).
buyer's ap
Ct.,

offered and the
control of the assets were circum
to
put the sellers on notice. In this situation
is justified on general tort principles. The freedom
cases

parent haste
stances held

the

F.

high prices

to secure

Continued

on

page

10

the buyer was planning to represent to minority share
holders that the majority had accepted the same price for
their shares. Such

misleading statements were actually
might well have been given on the
ground that the minority were improperly induced to part
with their shares. This ground is discussed below.
However, in cases where no special abuse was involved,
the convenient arrangement for transfer of control by
resignation and filling of vacancies has not been held to remade, and the

recovery

other members of the Bench. Left to right:
and
Judge Ryan Duffy
Judge H. Nathan Swaim, JD '16, of the
U.S. Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit); Judge Elmer J. Schnack

Mr.

Justice

Burton

greeting

F.

enberg, JD '12, of the same court; Judge Julius Hoffman, of the U.S.
District Court; and Judge Hugo Friend, JD '08,
of the Illinois Appel
late Court.
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Lectures

on

Eminent

Vol. 6) No.2

Lawyers

The series of lectures on eminent members of the Bar
which The Law School is sponsoring, and which began

Tappan Gregory's lecture

with Mr.

on

"Stephen Strong

continued during the Winter Quarter.
Gregory,"
Mr. John C. Slade, of Winston, Strawn, Smith and Patter
son, spoke on "Silas H. Strawn." Mr. Slade was a partner
of the late Mr. Strawn for many years and as such was
uniquely qualified to present a balanced portrait of Silas
Strawn's great contribution, both to the Bar and to society
was

generally.

Mr. Slade's

address will be found elsewhere in

this issue of the Record.
Prior

to

the lecture, which

was

presented

in Breasted

Hall, the Faculty was host at a dinner in Mr. Slade's honor
in the Quadrangle Club.
The next lecture in the series will be delivered by Mr.
Henry F. Tenney, JD '15, of Tenney, Sherman, Bentley
and Guthrie, Chicago. Mr. Tenney will speak on his father,

Tenney, in Breasted Hall, Fifty-eighth Street
and University Avenue, on Monday, April 22, at 8:30 P.M.
Horace Kent

At the dinner preceding the Slade

fessor

Soia

Mentschikoj[,

The court's

their duties

KatzContinued from page

2

of controlling shareholders

to

sell their shares does

not

in

intending to loot
the corporation. Furthermore, general principles of negli
gence may be invoked if reasonable inquiry has not been

clude freedom

to

sell

to one

known

be

to

made in the face of circumstances which would suggest
to a reasonable man the likelihood of such intentions.
In these cases recovery is measured by the loss to the

corporation, although in the Gerdes case the court also re
quired accounting for the excessive portion of the sale
price as a separable consideration for sale of control.
There are two other cases imposing liability on sellers of
control which are more difficult to classify and which
arguably afford some basis for a broader rule of liability.
The first of these is Commonwealth T. 1. & T. Co.
227 Pa. 410

(1910).

The defendant

corporation; he had

no

substantial

v.

Seltzer,

of a hotel

president
stockholding and was
purchase the corporate

was

approached by interests desiring to
property. Although knowing that
willing to sell," he led the outsider

"his company was
to believe that the

property was not [or sale and then formed a plan to acquire
the controlling shares and sell them to the outsider at a
profit. It was part of the plan that the purchaser would then
acquire the corporate property. This plan was carried out
with the help of the co-defendant director. The defendants
remained corporate officers after the resale of the shares
and acted as such in the sale of the corporate property. The
price paid for the property was "not found to be inade

quate." The defendants were required to account to the
plaintiffs (apparently shareholders who did not sell out) for
the fraction of their profits allocable to the plaintiffs' shares.

as

theory

Lecture, Laird Bell, JD '07,

and John D.

was

officers

Black,

Pro

with law students.

that the defendants had violated

by making

profit

a

in connection

with the sale of corporate property; the stock transactions
were viewed as mere devices to
appropriate a part of the
consideration for the property. The relief was given "on the

peculiar facts" of the case, with "full and express recogni
tion of the general rule that a stockholder, even though he
be one of the managing officers
has the right to buy
and sell its stock and to keep any profits which he may thus
acquire."
...

,

Suppose, however, that the defendants had owned the

controlling shares from the outset and that they had frankly
rejected the offer for the corporate assets in order to realize
more
through the sale of their shares at a premium. Would
be
they
required to account? No confident answer can be
drawn from the Seltzer opinion.
The other case which is difficult to classify is Perlman v.
Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn., 1952), 219 F. zd
173 (C.A. zd, 1955). Here a 37 per cent block of shares of
Newport Steel Corporation

was sold in 1950 to a
group
of industrial users of steel at $20 per share when recent
market sales had not exceeded $12. The purchasers were
concededly interested in securing supplies of steel in the
tight Korean war market. Steel price levels were being
maintained by voluntary "controls," but steel companies,
including Newport, had found ways to realize advantages
in allocating their production, including interest-free loans
from customers. The plaintiffs contended that the defend
ant's sale constituted an appropriation of the value of these
advantages. The district court dismissed the action after
trial, but the court of appeals reversed (Swan,]., dissent
ing). The court said:

We do

dispose

having to

suggest that a majority stockholder cannot
block of stock to outsiders without
his corporation for profits or even never do

not mean to

of his

controlling

account to

Vol. 6, No.2

The

University of Chicago
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Law School

this with

Modern

actual

that "the power going with 'control' is an asset which be
longs only to the corporation; and that payment for that

impunity when the buyer is an interested customer,
potential, for the corporation's product. But when the
sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate
good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who has
or

power, if it goes

caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time
of market shortage, where a call on a corporation's product

tion of control

premium.

This passage suggests that the case was treated as analogous
the looting cases. The court could say that sale of control

to

management would

new

not

corporation

and would thus violate its

loyalty.

No reference

made

was

to

the

fiduciary duty of
looting decisions,

however, and this may possibly reflect a desire to make the
opinion serviceable as an entering wedge for a broader rule
of liability.

The

ing

foregoing is a summary of the principal cases impos
restrictions upon sales of controlling shares. In none of

these

cases

does the

same

offer

must

argue for

a broad rule that the
all shareholders, and many of
the opinions expressly reject this rule. Furthermore, there
are a number of decisions
(in addition to the Dunnett
cases) in which the court refused to make the seller account
for a premium. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 38 N.Y.S.
zd 517 (rsr Dept., I942). Tryon v. Smith, I9I Ore. I72

opinion

be made

go into the corporate

as

a

asset

Presumably
is

a

urged for a broad restriction on sales of
from
concern over the motives of the
pur
springs
chaser and the type of transactions likely to follow the
transfer of control. Professor Jennings suggests that in the
usual case the purchaser's willingness to pay a premium
springs from an expectation of returns which will not be
shared with all shareholders, returns flowing from private
exploitation of "corporate patronage or other non-balance
sheet assets or from diversion of profits in reorganization or
liquidation." The concern is that the purchaser and those
he places on the board will not exercise their management
powers in the interests of all the shareholders and that the
usual rules of fiduciary loyalty are insufficient protection
against such mismanagement.
This suggestion recalls the Newport Steel Corporation
case, in which the sale was to a group interested primarily in
The first

allocate

in accordance with the best interests of the

must

should this be true?

reason

control

a

production

anywhere,

Property. They suggested

way?

potential customer under conditions of shortage re
sulted necessarily in sacrifice of corporate good will only
to a

if it assumed that the

and Private

the no
of
corporate
way
saying
that the law should make it impossible for holders of
controlling shares to realize the fUll market value of their
shares-or what would be the market value in the absence
of the rule suggested. Why should the law intervene in this

treasury." Why

commands an unusually large premium, in one form or another,
we think it sound law that a
fiduciary may not appropriate to

himself the value of this

Corporation

to

(I95I).
The view that

premium value

controlling

shares may have a legitimate
by the decision of the

is also illustrated

House of Lords in Short

v.

Treasury Commrs., [19481

534· Here the government

A. C.

had taken all the shares of

a

corporation under Defense Regulations requiring the pay
ment

buyer

of "not less than the value
as between a
willing
and a willing seller." Holders of relatively small
...

.

blocks of shares objected to the price offered (295. 3d.),
which was based upon stock-market quotations. They con
tended that the price should have been determined by
valuing the entire enterprise and dividing by the number
of shares. The arbitrator found that on such a basis each
share would have been worth 4IS. 9d. This contention,
however, was rejected. Lord Uthwatt said:
If

some one

carry control

shareholder held

a

number of shares sufficient

to

of the company, it

might well be that the value
holding under the regulation was

to be attributed to his
greater than the sum of the values that would be attributed to the
shares comprised in that holding if they were split between

proper

various persons. The reason is that he has
something to sell
control-which the others considered separately have not. The
contention of the appellant, if accepted, would, as the Court of
Appeal point out, deny him the real value of his holding.

In this paper, however, my concern is not with the
present state of the law but with the desirability of a rule
which would destroy the premium value of controlling

shares. Such

a

rule

was

urged by

Berle and Means in The

Barnabas Sears, vice-president of the Illinois State Bar Association,
and Stanton Hyer, JD '25, of Rockford, Illinois, at the dinner for

Justice

Burton.
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Barnabas Sears, vice-president of the Illinois State Bar Association,
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Justice
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securing the corporation's output of steel and unlikely to
allocate this output in the corporation's own interest. Mod
ern complexities of business practice and tax law
open up
many similar opportunities for private advantage through
corporate control. For example, a corporation with a sub

stantial

of income-tax losses may be led into
a
merger on terms which do not realize for the corpora
tion's shareholders the value of the tax advantage which it is
contributing. While the word "looting" is perhaps too
strong for these activities, they all constitute breaches of
fiduciary duties of management.

carry-forward

Professor Jennings recognizes that the power incident to
voting control may also be utilized "to organize an en
ergetic and capable managerial echelon, improve earnings,
and thereby boost the price of the stock, to the benefit of all
stockholders." But he considers that cases of such motiva
tion

'unusual and

are

in the

weight

apparently

analysis

of the

rare

so

problem.

as

This is

not
a

to

have

critical

as

unwarranted; suppose that there is
sumption. Suppose
a
significant proportion of cases where existing manage
ment is ineffective and where outsiders are attracted
by the
for
of
opportunity
profit through purchase
controlling
shares and improvement of management, earnings, and
dividends. Ifthis is true, one must consider the consequences
of a rule restricting the opportunities of such purchasers-
consequences to the holders of minority shares as well as
it is

more remote

economic consequences.

difficult, of course,

be confident of any general
typical buyers of control as
with
those
of
typical sellers. In the absence of
compared
evidence one might expect considerable variety in both
groups, and it is by no means obvious that potential sellers
It is

to

ization about the motives of

persons who resist temptation to abuse their
management powers while potential buyers are hardened,
though sophisticated, sinners. Professor Leech is apparently
are

typically

dubious about both groups, for he says: "It is still to be
shown that there is inherent virtue in protecting a system

whereby

one

block of shareholders

their fellows is
It

share

seems

to

supplanted by

clear that

be made

to

rule

largely unresponsive to

another."

requiring the

offer per
all shareholders would block some sales
a

same

of control. It is

likely that there are some persons willing to
bid for controlling shares who would be unwilling to pur
rule requiring equal
chase all the shares. Furthermore,
offers will tend to reduce the amount that buyers will offer
to the holder of the controlling block (since it increases
what must be offered to others), and in marginal cases the
reduction may make the offer unacceptable to the seller. It
is impossible to estimate the proportion of possible sales
that would thus be blocked by the rule under consideration.
a

If it is

a

substantial

proportion, and if cases of sales blocked

substantial number where present
by
management is inefficient, the adoption of the rule would
be at the expense of groups of minority shareholders whose
the rule include

prospects

a

might otherwise

be

improved.

Indirect economic

Vol. 6, No.2

effects of thus impeding the improvement of manage
might also be substantial.

ment

These considerations should
Cases where

buyers

are

likely

not
to

be treated

inflict

as

negligible.

particular injuries

upon the corporation can be handled by a rule limited to
such situations, as in the Newport Steel case. Even if there

they afford inadequate support
broad rule which impedes desirable transfers.
Sometimes the case for a rule against premium sales is
argued in different terms, entirely without reference to the
motives of the buyer or his anticipated behavior. Here the
starting point is a general concept of community of interest
among shareholders-a concept of joint venture with
are

many such situations,

for

a

strong

overtones

implied

rate asset.

thus

of equality. Such

when Professor Berle

speaks

concept is apparently
of control as a corpo

of interest, it is
that, when the controlling shareholder with

From this

argued

a

draws from the

premise of community

joint

venture, it should

only

be

on terms

which put other shareholders in a position of equality.
This would be the rule in the case of a partnership. No
partner by selling his interest can transfer control over the
investment of his co-partners. But should the transferabil
ity of corporate shares be similarly restricted? It puzzles me
to find Professor Berle insisting on this equalization of con
and non-controlling shares. One of the main
themes of his book is the distinction between "active
property" (property actively managed by its owner) and

trolling

"passive property" (held by inactive,

"absentee"

owners).

Berle criticizes the legal "logic of property" for ignoring
this distinction. He questions whether the owner of "pas
sive property" is entitled to the full incidents of ownership.
"Because an owner who also exercises control over his
wealth is protected in the full receipt of the advantages de

rived from it, must it necessarily follow that an owner who
has surrendered control of his wealth should likewise be
protected to the full?" It seems incongruous that the same
author insists that the law should transfer to the "passive"
shareholder part of the value which the market allocates to
the

controlling block.
Why should the law impose

this particular concept of
all
interest
of
corporations? Such a rule
upon
community
in small holdings;
investment
might possibly encourage
to make majority
incentive
also
reduce
the
it
but
might
to
leave the matter
were
that
the
law
investments. Suppose
to

negotiation

between the

of the corporation.

It is

by

parties prior to
no means

the

organization

clear that

they would

holder should

agree that the

prospective majority
forego opportunities for premium sales. Minority

always

investors

eventualities their interests
might well realize that in
might be served by a free transferability which would facili
tate improvement of management. I cannot find in the
some

general idea of community of interest a persuasive reason
why incorporation should necessarily be on terms restrict
ing alienation of controlling shares.
The community-of-interest argument is sometimes
stated in

more

limited

terms.

In this form it is

an

argument
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for restricting sale of controlling shares only when there is
buyer seeking either all the shares or a "corporate transac
tion" such as a merger or asset purchase. Here the argument
for "equality" is at its strongest, since equality would be
the rule in case of a "corporate transaction." The proponent
of such a limited restraint concedes the propriety of pre
mium sales in other situations. But how is one to define the
situation in which the restriction is to apply? Is the con
trolling shareholder free to sell only after he has failed,
after reasonable efforts, to find a proposal in which all can

a
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participate? Will the presence of any such proposal, regard
less of the terms, bring the restraint into operation? Or
offer on terms which are later found to be
seems to me no
There
way of defining the
"adequate"?
will
limited
which
rule
accomplish its purposes
proposed
and yet afford a workable basis for advising the controlling
shareholder as to his freedom to sell. The only practical
alternatives seem to me the general restriction which Pro
fessor Jennings supports and the rule for which I have
argued-limiting relief to cases of special abuse.
must

it be

tutor,
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